The most basic question one can ask of a model is "According to the model, what is the e¤ect of variable y 1 on variable y 2 ?"; where y 1 and y 2 are two variables determined by the model. Causation is "implementation neutral"when all interventions on external variables that lead to a given change in y 1 have the same e¤ect on y 2 : We derive conditions for implementation neutrality in simple formal models.
two variables determined by the model. 1 Two answers are possible. The …rst involves observing that many possible interventions on the model's external variables could have led to the assumed change in y 1 ; and in general the e¤ects of these interventions on y 2 are di¤erent. Therefore the question "What is the e¤ect of y 1 on y 2 ?" does not have an unambiguous answer: the information given about the intervention-its e¤ect on y 1 -is insu¢ cient to characterize the e¤ect of the intervention on y 2 .
The second answer is that even though the intervention is not completely characterized for the reason just noted, all interventions consistent with the assumed change in y 1 may map onto the same change in y 2 : In that case the question "What is the e¤ect of y 1 on y 2 ?"has a well-de…ned answer. In linear systems, to which our attention will be restricted in this paper, the e¤ect is captured by a single constant, here labeled a 21 ; which gives the e¤ect on y 2 of a unit change of y 1 ; regardless of what intervention caused the change in y 1 :
If, as in the second case above, the e¤ect of a change in y 1 on y 2 is independent of how the change in y 1 is implemented, we will write y 1 ! y 2 ; and will say that the e¤ect of y 1 on y 2 is implementation-neutral. Thus, as the notation indicates, we incorporate implementation neutrality in the de…nition of causation. We do this on the grounds that implementation neutrality is implicit in the idea of causation: if implementation neutrality fails one cannot evaluate quantitatively the e¤ect of the intervention on y 2 ; that not being implied by the assumed change in y 1 .
If implementation neutrality fails one can only analyze the e¤ect on y 2 of various speci…c interventions on the determinants of y 1 :
2 Doing so amounts to abandoning the attempt to characterize y 1 as a cause of y 2 ; instead shifting the discussion to treating the external variables which determine y 1 as the causes of y 2 : Restricting the meaning of causation to cases where interventions are implementation neutral is, of course, purely a matter of de…nition: if one prefers to say instead that y 1 causes y 2 but only an implementation-speci…c account of the magnitude of the e¤ect is available, no harm is done, although doing so seems pointless to the extent that one is interested in evaluating causation quantitatively. 1 Abbreviated versions of this material were presented in LeRoy [12] and [13] (these papers are discussed at some length in Cartwright [1] ). Here more detail is supplied, and the packaging is somewhat di¤erent. 2 Note that throughout this paper no notational distinction is made between the name of a variable and the values that variable takes on.
The question of implementation neutrality is of central importance in applied scienti…c work: analysts want either to measure the impact of the treatment on the patient or to know that doing so is impossible because the e¤ect of that treatment depends on how it is applied. Restricting the term "causation" to settings where causation is implementation neutral amounts only to rejecting application of the term in settings in which it does not have a clear meaning. 3 Use of diagrammatical methods in causal analysis has become widespread in recent years, due to work by Pearl [14] , Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines [16] , Woodward [18] , Hausman [8] , Cartwright [1] and others. These authors typically do not include implementation neutrality in their de…nition of causation. As we will see, implementation-neutral causation is antisymmetric, so it results in directed acyclic diagrams of the type in common use. Therefore one has the option of imposing implementation neutrality in the derivation of causal orderings represented as directed acyclic diagrams, and comparing how doing so a¤ects the results. This paper addresses questions related to the construction and interpretation of directed acyclic diagrams when causation is restricted to be implementation neutral.
Characterization of Implementation-Neutral Causation
A distinction that is central in any model that deals with issues of causation is that between internal and external variables. Internal variables are those determined by the model, while external variables are those taken as given; i.e., determined outside the model. 4 We will use y to denote internal vari- 3 However, the opposite can be argued. Pearl [14] , p. 136, took the view that linking causation with implementation neutrality "denies any causal reading to most of the structural parameters that economists and social scientists labor to estimate."On the contrary, if the argument here is accepted attempts by economists and social scientists to estimate parameters associated with causation are hopeless when implementation neutrality fails because in that case these parameters are not well de…ned. 4 In the earlier literature the terms "endogenous" and "exogenous" were often used in place of "internal"and "external". The earlier usage is consistent with the etymology of the terms, but econometricians have implemented a change in their meaning (see Granger [6] , wherein I am reprimanded for using the earlier terms in LeRoy [12] ). To avoid ambiguity, economists now use "internal" and "external" when the earlier meaning is intended, as here.
ables and x to denote external variables. All changes in solution values of internal variables are assumed to be attributable to interventions on external variables, as opposed to alterations of equations. Implementing this attribution requires the analyst to be explicit about which hypothetical alterations in the model are permitted and which are ruled out. Of course, the analyst can always implement a shift on any of the equations of the model simply by specifying that the relevant equation has an external shift variable. In that case the shift variable is a cause of any internal variable that depends on it. Doing so, of course, is not the same as converting one of the internal variables to an external variable, which constitutes an alteration of the model.
External variables are assumed to be variation-free: that is, the analyst is free to alter them independently. Independent variation corresponds to the assumption that by de…nition external variables are not linked by functional relations; otherwise they would be classi…ed as internal. The solution form of a model expresses each internal variable as a function of the set of external variables that determine it. 5 We will refer to the set of external variables that determine any internal variable as its external set, and will denote the external set for y i as E(y i ): We will assume that the external set for any internal variable consists of at least two external variables. Otherwise the internal variable is a rescaling of the external variable (assuming linearity); a model containing an internal variable the external set of which consists of one external variable can be simpli…ed by deleting one of the variables. Also, we will assume below that internal variables are observable and external variables are not. Allowing equations in which the external set of some internal variable consists of a single variable would cause ambiguity.
There is no di¢ culty in de…ning causation when the cause variable is external: x i causes y j whenever x i is in the external set for y j and, by virtue of linearity, in that case a unique constant b ji gives the e¤ect of a unit change in x i on y j for any values of the external variables. If x i is not in the external set for y j the former does not cause the latter. The ambiguity comes up when the cause variable is internal, since then an assumed change in the For discussion of various de…nitions of exogeneity and endogeneity see Leamer [11] . For a statement of the de…nition of exogeneity currently favored by econometricians see Engle, Hendry and Richard [4] . 5 We thus distinguish between the solution form and the reduced form, in which currentdate internal variables are expressed as functions of lagged internal variables and external variables. In static models the solution form and reduced form coincide.
cause variable could come from interventions on any or all of the variables in its external set, and in general the e¤ect of the interventions on y j is di¤erent for each possible set of interventions. This is so even if all the contemplated interventions are restricted to have the same e¤ect on the cause variable. Given this ambiguity, we cannot attribute causation in this case: the intervention is not described with su¢ cient detail to generate a clear answer.
However, consider a special case in which two conditions are satis…ed. These conditions involve two internal variables, y i and y j ; and their external sets E(y i ) and E(y j ). The …rst is the subset condition, which requires that the external set for y i is a proper subset of that of y j . The subset condition guarantees that any external variable that a¤ects y i also a¤ects y j ; but not vice-versa. Hoover [9] in particular emphasized this condition, which assures the antisymmetry of causation. 6 The second is the su¢ ciency condition, which states that the map from E(y j ) to y j can be expressed as the sum of two functions. The …rst function is the composition of a function from E(y i ) to y i and a function from y i to y j ; while the second is a function from E(y j ) E(y i ) to y j : If such functions exist y i is a su¢ cient statistic for E(y i ) for the purpose of determining y j ; meaning that for the purpose of determining y j an intervention on any or all of the variables in E(y i ) is adequately characterized by the resulting induced change in y i : If the subset and su¢ ciency conditions are satis…ed we can write y i ! y j : In that case causation is implementation neutral, since any intervention on the elements of E(y i ) that results in a …xed y i will result in the same y j :
In the causal form of a model the equations are written in such a way as 6 In this paper the subset condition is a condition we impose on models to assure that causation is antisymmetric. Hausman ( [8] , Ch. 4) had a di¤erent take on what we call the subset condition. Hausman's independence condition states that "if a causes b ..., then b has a cause that is distinct from a and not causally connected to a:"Hausman appears to view the independence condition, not as an assumption in a model, but as a proposition about the world that may or may not be true: "As a metaphysical claim about patterns of lawlike connections found in nature, [the independence condition] seems incredible, and its truth miraculous." (p. 64).
However, he went on to consider another possible interpretation, that the failure of the independence condition implies only that there may exist lawlike relations in the world that are not speci…cally causal relations. This is so because causality inherently involves antisymmetry, and antisymmetry may not occur if the independence condition fails. This latter interpretation is closer to the position taken here.
to re ‡ect its causal structure. Starting from the solution form of the model, one can readily derive its causal form. First one derives the causal ordering, which consists of determining for each i and j whether or not we have that y i is a parent of y j : In the causal form of the model the equation for each internal variable y i that has no internal variables as causal parents coincides with the corresponding equation in the solution form of the model (i.e., consists of a map from E(y i ) to y i ). 7 The causal form for internal variables y j that have one or more internal variables as causal parents consists of a map from the parent, or from each of the parents, to y j , plus a map to y j from the elements of E(y j ) that are not in the external sets of any of the parents of y j . The causal form of a model is written as
Here y i is the (single, in this case) internal variable that causes y j ; and
The case in which y j has more than one parent is handled by expanding the set of arguments of f j appropriately. Note our substitution of for =; since causation is irre ‡exive and antisymmetric it is inappropriate to use the equality relation in writing the causal form of a model. Observe that the conditions for causation di¤er from those de…ning recursive models. Any model can be put in recursive form by using algebraic operations on the model's equations, but the causal form depends on assumed parameter restrictions on the solution form of the model, which is unique. It follows that writing a model in recursive form does not imply that the coe¢ cients can be interpreted as quantifying a causal ordering (unless the recursive form coincides with the causal form).
One can represent the causal form of the model by a causal diagram. For variables y i without internal variables as parents this consists of arrows drawn to y i from each element of E(y i ); as in the solution form. For variables with internal parents the arrows run to y j from the parent(s) of y j ; and also to y j from each variable that is an element of the external set of y j but is not in the external sets of any of its parents.
Note that under our convention the causal form does not include as arguments internal variables that are ancestors when these are not also parents. To include both a parent and its ancestors in a single causal equation would involve double counting. The corresponding convention applies to causal diagrams: no arrow directly connects variables with their ancestors when these are not parents.
An example will make this clear.
Example
Consider the following model, written in solution form:
The external sets for y 1 and y 2 are E(y 1 ) = fx 1 ; x 2 g and E(y 2 ) = fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g: The former is a strict subset of the latter, so the subset condition for y 1 ! y 2 is satis…ed. Without parameter restrictions the su¢ ciency condition for y 1 ! y 2 is not satis…ed. However, if the condition
obtains the su¢ ciency condition is satis…ed. In that case we can de…ne a 21 by
allowing replacement of (3) by
(use (4) and (2) to eliminate a 21 and y 1 in (6), resulting in (3)). We have
To repeat, y 1 causes y 2 in this case because all interventions in x 1 and x 2 consistent with a given change in y 1 have the same e¤ect on y 2 : If, on the other hand, the condition (4) fails then di¤erent interventions in x 1 and x 2 consistent with a given change in y 1 lead to di¤erent e¤ects on y 2 ; so the outcome of the assumed change in y 1 on y 2 is ambiguous. In that case we will say that y 1 does not cause y 2 :
If the condition (4) is satis…ed the causal form of the model consists of equations (2) and (6), while if it is not the causal form coincides with the solution form, which is (2) and (3). The upper panel of Figure 1 shows the The subset condition guarantees that if y i ! y j then there exists at least one external variable that causes y j but does not cause y i : This condition implies that causation is antisymmetric (y i ! y j implies y j 9 y i ). This does not mean that it is necessary to restrict attention to models that are recursive; however, it is the case that to the extent that models contain blocks of simultaneous equations there will not exist causal arrows connecting the internal variables in these blocks. In the extreme case of a completely simultaneous model without parameter restrictions the causal ordering (restricted to the internal variables) will be empty and the causal form of the model will be the same as the solution form. This makes sense: in models without special restrictions the e¤ect of one internal variable on another is ambiguous. An important aspect of the de…nition of causation just presented is that causation is transitive: if y 1 ! y 2 with coe¢ cient a 21 and y 2 ! y 3 with coe¢ cient a 32 ; then y 1 ! y 3 with coe¢ cient a 31 = a 21 a 32 : The transitivity of causation has the implication that an internal variable never has both an indirect e¤ect on another variable via a causal chain involving one or more third variables, and also a distinct direct e¤ect; rather, the direct e¤ect is always the composition of the indirect e¤ects. This outcome, although highly counterintuitive, is an implication of implementation neutrality: any model which purports to represent a setting with both direct and indirect causation (with the former distinct from the composition of the latter) must involve the ambiguity in causal attributions that accompanies failure of implementation neutrality.
Comparison with Simon
It is instructive to compare the representation of causation just presented with that of Simon's classic [15] paper.
Simon observed that any linear structural model contains a set of selfcontained sub-models, with some (or all) of the internal variables determined in each sub-model. These self-contained sub-models are ordered: each submodel contains the internal variables determined in that sub-model and, except for the lowest-ordered sub-models, also some or all of those internal variables determined in lower-ordered sets. Fully recursive models, in which each internal variable is determined by a single equation, are the most extreme special case. Block-recursive models constitute the general case. Under Simon's de…nition we have y 1 ! y 2 if y 1 appears in the sub-model that determines y 2 ; but is determined in a lower-order sub-model.
There exist two major di¤erences between the treatment of causation here and that of Simon. The …rst is that causation here is de…ned from the solution form of the model, as opposed to its structural form as with Simon. The fact that we base the de…nition of causation on the solution form allows us to sidestep debates about the meaning of the term "structural model", a question that occupied the early writers on simultaneous equation models. Also, our characterization of causality has the bene…t that it applies to models in which the analyst does not specify a structural form of the model distinct from its solution form. We consider structural models in which each equation takes the left-hand side of each of its equations as consisting of one of the internal variables, and the right-hand side as consisting of some of the other internal variables and one or more of the external variables. 8 It is easily veri…ed that Simon's criterion for causation coincides with our subset condition: if y 1 is determined in a lower-order sub-model than y 2 ; then the external set for y 1 is a proper subset of the external set for y 2 . However, and this is the second di¤erence between our treatment and Simon's, there is no analogue in Simon's discussion for our su¢ ciency condition: under Simon's de…nition the subset condition by itself is necessary and su¢ cient for causation. Thus in comparing the de…nition here with that of Simon the question becomes to determine the consequences of (1) working with the solution form of a model rather than a structural model, and of (2) imposing the su¢ ciency condition.
Our …rst result is that in the simplest setting Simon's characterization of causation leads to the same causal ordering as ours. This occurs because in the simplest case Simon's speci…cation of a structural-form rather than solution-form model turns out to be equivalent to imposing the su¢ ciency condition on the solution form of the model. To see this, consider the model of the preceding subsection. In the model consisting of (2) and (6) y 1 is determined in a lower-order block than y 2 , implying that y 1 causes y 2 by Simon's criterion. But writing the model in recursive form, as these equations do, implies that when one calculates the solution form of the model, the solution coe¢ cients (2)- (3) satisfy (4) . Therefore specifying the structural model guarantees that the conditions for a causal ordering as derived from the solution form, plus the parameter restriction, are satis…ed.
Our major result is that in larger models the equivalence between Simon's characterization of causation and that proposed here breaks down. It follows that causation as Simon de…ned it is not generally implementation neutral. To see this, consider the recursive structural model
By Simon's criterion the causal ordering here is y 1 ! y 2 ; y 1 ! y 3 and y 2 ! y 3 : It is immediately clear that this causal ordering cannot occur under our de…nition of causation. Under our characterization of causation, y 1 ! y 2 and y 2 ! y 3 imply y 1 ! y 3 as the composition of the two causal functions, as observed above. In the causal ordering under Simon's de…nition we see that, in contrast, y 1 ! y 3 appears separately, with a causal coe¢ cient that is not functionally related to the causal coe¢ ents associated with y 1 ! y 2 and y 2 ! y 3 : It follows that in the model just formulated the causal ordering that occurs under Simon's de…nition cannot be characterized as implementationneutral under any speci…cation of coe¢ cient restrictions on the solution form.
The solution form of the structural model just presented can be written as
In the absence of restrictions on the solution-form coe¢ cients the causal ordering by our de…nition is empty. (11) by y 2 = a 21 y 1 + b 23 x 3 ; corresponding to y 1 ! y 2 . In that case the causal form of the model consists of (7), (8) and (12) . Under only this restriction y 1 and y 2 are not causally connected to y 3 ; there exists no set of restrictions on (10)- (12) the results in (7)- (9) as representing the causal form of the model Connecting the de…nition of causation here with that of the Cowles researchers requires determining further consequences of the fact that causation here is de…ned from the solution form of the model, whereas the Cowles economists de…ned causation from the structural form. Up to now we have identi…ed structural models as consisting of equations written in recursive form. The equality symbol being what it is, the distinction so characterized is trivial. For the Cowles economists the signi…cance of structural equations had to do with the role they assigned to the coe¢ cients (see, for example, Hurwicz [10] ). They modeled behavioral changes in a structural modelsinterventions-as consisting of shifts in coe¢ cients. This involves interpreting the coe¢ cients of purportedly linear models as external variables, rather than constants as in our treatment. Thus in the Cowles usage structural models e¤ectively have two types of external variables: (1) the variables explicitly labeled as external and (2) the model coe¢ cients, which are implicitly treated as external variables. The former represent the routine functioning of the model, and the latter are used in modeling interventions. The treatment here, in contrast, does not distinguish these two types of external variables.
As a result of this reinterpretation of coe¢ cients as variables rather than constants, models that are formally represented as linear in variables are actually bilinear. This bilinearity property would have greatly complicated the analysis of causation if the Cowles economists had elected to acknowledge it explicitly. We avoided the problem of de…ning causation in bilinear models by adopting a linear setting, which involves treating coe¢ cients as constants rather than external variables.
Bilinear models can be linearized, and doing so allows a comparison of our analysis with Simon's that is accurate up to the accuracy of the linear approximation. For example, consider the model
As already noted, interpreted as a causal model these equations have
If this model is considered to be structural, a 21 is interpretable as an external variable rather than a constant. Under our notation, following general practice, variables are indicated by letters from the end of the alphabet (x and y) and constants are indicated by letters from the beginning of the alphabet, so we relabel a 21 as x 4 : There results the model
The linearized version of this model (with constants deleted, as throughout this paper) is
where the a an b coe¢ cients are rede…ned. This model has y 1 ! y 2 : Again we see that in the simplest case Simon's de…nition of a causal ordering coincides with ours. In larger models one can implement the same exercise, consisting of relabeling some or all of the coe¢ cients as external variables, linearizing the resulting model, solving for the solution form and determining the causal ordering. We have already seen that in larger models the derived causal orderings will generally di¤er from those derived here.
Empirical Aspects of Causation
Up to this point we have considered models in which variables are speci…ed as to their status as internal or external. We have not speci…ed which variables are observable or what we are assuming about the probability distributions of those that are not. That we could postpone discussion of observability to this point re ‡ects the facts that the characterization of causation and the existence or nonexistence of the constants associated with causation depend only on whether the conditions for implementation neutrality are satis…ed. They do not depend on which variables are observable or what is assumed about those that are not. However, without specifying which variables are observable and characterizing the probability distribution of unobserved external variables there is no way to estimate causal coe¢ cients: in the absence of identifying information the correlations among internal variables implied by the model's causal structure cannot be disentangled those induced by correlations among the external variables. The most direct way to launch an investigation of the empirical aspects of causation is to specify, …rst, that external variables are unobservable and internal variables are observable. This speci…cation covers many of the cases of interest. However, it does not cover all: assuming that external variables are not observable rules out at least some kinds of nonstationary models. Further, assuming that internal variables are observable rules out latent variables, a topic of major interest in applied work. The motivation for adopting this restriction is to simplify the analysis.
Second, it is assumed that the external variables are statistically independent random variables. This assumption implies that whatever correlations exist among the model's internal variables are generated by the equations of the model, not by uninterpreted correlations among external variables. Without this assumption, or something similar, there is no way to proceed.
The assumptions just listed imply that if we have y 1 ! y 2 the coe¢ cient measuring the e¤ect of y 1 on y 2 is identi…ed, and can be estimated consistently and without bias using a least-squares regression of y 2 on y 1 . This is so because the external variable(s) in E(y 2 ) E(y 1 )-the constituents of the error term in the regression-is (are) independent of E(y 1 ), and therefore of y 1 itself.
The …nding that causal coe¢ cients are always identi…ed di¤ers from the conclusion of the Cowles economists. The reason for the di¤erence is that, as noted, the Cowles economists treated causal coe¢ cients as synonymous with the coe¢ cients of structural equations, which may or may not be identi…ed. Here, in contrast, we avoid any reference to structural equations.
The result that causal coe¢ cients are always identi…ed should not be taken to imply that identi…cation is not a major problem in the analysis of causation. The coe¢ cients associated with causation have meaning only when the associated variables are causally ordered. Whether two variables are causally ordered depends on the coe¢ cients that link observed internal variables to unobserved external variables. These coe¢ cients are generally not identi…ed, implying that there is generally no way to check the conditions for causation directly. Thus the fact that causal coe¢ cients, when they exist, are always identi…ed does nothing to mitigate the di¢ culty of ascertaining whether two variables are causally related in the …rst place.
Under causation as characterized here, as with other de…nitions of causation, the restrictions justifying an assumed causal ordering can in principle be tested indirectly by identifying pairs of variables that are or are not statistically independent according to the model, and then determining whether these independence implications are satis…ed empirically. We now consider whether powerful empirical tests of causal models along these lines are likely to be available. It appears that they are not: only in special cases is it possible to characterize independence or the lack thereof among internal variables as testable implications of causal models.
Among the few results that are available is the obvious fact that any two internal variables for which the external sets are disjoint are statistically independent. As an implication, if an internal variable has two ancestors, then either one ancestor causes the other or the two are statistically independent. To see this, suppose that y 1 ! y 3 and y 2 ! y 3 ; so that y 3 has ancestors y 1 and y 2 . If E(y 1 ) and E(y 2 ) are disjoint, then y 1 and y 2 are statistically independent. Suppose instead that E(y 1 ) and E(y 2 ) have a nonempty intersection that contains external variable x: Then because (1) x 2 E(y 1 ); and (2) E(y 1 ) is a proper subset of E(y 3 ); there exists a path from x to y 3 that includes y 1 : Similarly, there exists a path from x to y 3 that includes y 2 : These must be the same path, since if the path included y 1 but not y 2 then y 2 could not be a su¢ cient statistic for E(y 2 ); contradicting y 2 ! y 3 : Thus there is a single path connecting x and y 3 ; and that path includes both y 1 and y 2 : This can occur only if y 1 ! y 2 or y 2 ! y 1 :
Past this there are not many results available about correlation of variables in causal models. Assume that y 1 and y 2 have y 3 as a common ancestor. If also y 1 ! y 2 ; then we have y 3 ! y 1 ! y 2 : In that case we have that all three variables are correlated since their external sets have a nonempty intersection (consisting of the external set for y 3 ). If, on the other hand, y 1 9 y 2 the causal coe¢ cient associated with y 1 ! y 2 is not de…ned. In the absence of causality, no inference about the correlation among variables is possible.
A related point is that even under the assumption that external variables are independently distributed, causation as characterized here does not satisfy the causal Markov condition (which says that any variable is statistically independent of any other variable that is not among the causal descendants of the …rst variable, conditional on the …rst variable's parents). This is obviously true, for example, in fully simultaneous systems. In that case the causal ordering is empty, so the causal Markov condition would imply that all internal variables are statistically independent. This is generally not the case.
Implementation neutrality implies that the causal Markov condition may fail even in systems that are not fully simultaneous. For instance, in the example of Section 2 with y 1 ! y 2 but not y 2 ! y 3 ; we have that y 2 and y 3 are not statistically independent, contrary to the implication of the causal Markov condition.
The fact the imposing implementation neutrality invalidates the causal Markov condition raises questions about the practice in the causation literature of taking the causal Markov condition as an axiom (as in Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines [16] , for example). The fact that the causal Markov condition fails under a de…nition of causation-that proposed here-that captures an important aspect of the ordinary-language meaning of causation suggests that the causal Markov condition depends on considerations not inherent in the idea of causation. We have not been informed as to what these conditions are. Accordingly, we are led to question the association of causation with the causal Markov condition.
Despite the foregoing discussion, it happens that some of the techniques of diagrammatical analysis developed in the causation literature do carry over in the present setting. For example, it is shown in the received literature that they are not causally connected. Whether probabilistic independence in this sense is equivalent to statistical independence depends on whether the causal Markov condition is satis…ed. As noted below, it is not satis…ed under implementation-neutral causality. Thus the result here is di¤erent from Hausman's. that if two internal variables are connected only by paths that are "blocked" because each contains a "collider" (a variable with incoming arrows from both directions), those variables are independent. That result appears to carry over here. An example will demonstrate this.
Example
Consider the following model:
(20)
(21)
(note that here we have supplied speci…c coe¢ cient values as well as external sets). The causal form of this model is
with Figure 2 as its causal diagram. Here y 1 and y 2 are statistically independent due to the fact that their external sets are disjoint. We have that y 1 and y 2 are parents of y 3 (and y 4 ), so the result illustrates the general fact noted above that if any internal variable has more than one ancestor, either these are independent or one ancestor is a cause of the other. This independence result can be generated using the diagrammatical techniques developed by Pearl and others for analysis of causation in settings where implementation neutrality is not imposed. In the example there exist two paths from y 1 to y 2 ; but both are blocked by existence of the colliders y 3 and y 4 . Therefore these paths do not transmit association. Independence of y 1 and y 2 results. Note that here the diagrammatical analysis applies by virtue of the assumption that the external variables are independently distributed, not because of the causal Markov condition, which as we have seen does not generally apply under implementation neutrality even if external variables are assumed independent. The result suggests that even though the conditions for causation analyzed here are di¤erent from those in the received literature, at least some of the diagrammatical techniques for analysis of causation carry over. The independence result does not extend to the children y 3 and y 4 except in special situations. For example, if the x i are normally distributed and all have the same variance, y 3 and y 4 are independent. However, if x 1 and x 2 have higher (lower) variance than x 3 and x 4 ; then y 3 and y 4 will be positively (negatively) correlated.
Conditioning on Internal Variables
The result in the preceding section that the coe¢ cient associated with any causal relation is identi…ed and can be estimated consistently using least squares depends critically on the underlying assumption that external variables are independently distributed and internal variables are fully observable. If some internal variable y i is observed only when it lies in a certain region, the relevant distribution assumed for the external variables is that conditional on this restriction, not the unconditional distribution. The joint distribution of the external variables conditional on y i will generally display statistical dependence even if the unconditional distribution of the external variables incorporates independence. This situation will not a¤ect the causal ordering of the variables, but it does invalidate the result that the coe¢ -cients associated with the causal ordering can be estimated consistently by least squares. This is so because failure of independence in the external variables implies that the error term covaries with the explanatory variable in the relevant regression, inducing bias and inconsistency.
As an extreme case, suppose that the analyst only has data in which y i takes on a single value, for some i: Obviously the coe¢ cient associated with y i ! y j or y j ! y i for some y j is not identi…ed, there being no variation in the cause variable in one case or the e¤ect variable in the other. A more common situation occurs when the data for y i are truncated, as by y i 0: In that case the sample regression coe¢ cient associated with y j ! y k is not a consistent estimate of the associated causal coe¢ cient if either y j or y k has external sets that overlap with that of y i : This is so because if y i is subject to a restriction like y i 0 the relevant joint distribution of the external variables in E(y i ) is that conditional on y i 0; and this does not generally have any independence property.
A simple example (adopted from Elwert [3] ) illustrates this. Suppose that movie actors become famous if they are good looking or can act well, or both. Assume, probably realistically, that being good looking and being a good actor are independently distributed. If the analyst has a data set consisting only of actors who are famous, then any actor in that set who is not good looking must be a good actor, since otherwise he would not be famous. Thus in the data set of famous actors there will be a negative correlation between being good looking and being a good actor, even though by assumption there is no such correlation in the general population. Any statistical exercise that makes no allowance for this e¤ect will be biased.
We will not discuss statistical procedures to deal with this problem since the problem does not directly involve causal issues. The point here is only to demonstrate that the attractive statistical properties of least squares in estimating causal coe¢ cients do not apply universally when data on internal variables are not fully observed.
Comparison with "Fixing"
The analysis of causation outlined in this paper di¤ers in major respects from what is found in the literature. Most important, interventions here consist of hypothetical alterations in the assumed values of external variables. In contrast, as noted above the usual treatment in the literature (based on Haavelmo [7] and Strotz and Wold [17] ) involves modeling policy interven-tions on, say, y 1 by deleting from the model the equation determining y 1 and replacing it with the speci…cation that y 1 is external. This practice of "…x-ing" internal variables and deleting equations when analyzing interventions seems misdirected. It violates the autonomy assumption (which consists of the assertion, central under the Cowles approach, that the model equations are assumed invariant to assumed interventions). It does not make sense to claim to analyze interventions using a model if doing so involves changing the model to accommodate the intervention.
Fixing internal variables involves a troubling inconsistency between how model solutions are generated in the routine operation of the model-via realizations of external variables-and how they are modeled under a policy intervention-via relabeling internal variables as external and suppressing equations. What is it about policy interventions that motivates this di¤erence in treatment? We are not told. It seems much simpler to be consistent about carrying over the attribution of assumed interventions on internal variables to underlying changes in the external variables that determine them, and thereby to avoid altering the equations of the model.
Besides this, there are several major problems with modeling interventions by …xing internal variables. Most obviously, it applies only in recursive systems, since in the presence of simultaneity y 1 is determined jointly with other variables in a group of several or many equations. In that case there does not exist any obvious way to identify which equation is to be deleted.
The Strotz-Wold procedure assumes that causal models are modular, meaning that causal relations can be modi…ed individually without invalidating the other equations of the model (modularity has been discussed widely in the philosophical literature on causation; see, for example, Cartwright [1] and the works cited there). Under our treatment, in contrast, the existence or nonexistence of causal e¤ects is calculated from the solution form, not the structural equations that purportedly express the modularity assumption. Since our analysis does not involve replacing equations with exogeneity speci…cations, the question of modularity does not come up.
Modeling interventions by respecifying internal variables as externalthe Strotz-Wold procedure-implies that causation will be treated as if it were implementation neutral whether or not this treatment is justi…ed when causality is modeled as proposed here. If implementation neutrality fails coe¢ cients will be interpreted as causal when they do not support that interpretation under the present causal de…nition. It is far from clear why one would want to take this route. In general the question "What is the e¤ect of y 1 on y 2 ?"is properly viewed as possibly depending on what brings about the change in y 1 . The model encodes exactly this information in the equations determining y 1 : Therefore the analyst can determine whether the question of causation has an unambiguous answer, but only if he avoids deleting the equations that determine y 1 from the model. Strotz and Wold and other proponents of analyzing interventions by reclassifying internal variables as external do not explain why it makes sense to adopt a framework that implies suppression of the question of whether causation is unambiguous.
6 Application: Granger Causation 10 Granger [5] proposed a de…nition of causation that can be implemented empirically without relying on theoretical restrictions: a stochastic process (i.e., sequence of random variables) y 1 = fy 1t g Granger-causes another process y 2 if the optimal prediction of future values of y 2 based on past values of y 2 alone can be improved by including current and lagged values of y 1 as explanatory variables. It is asserted that if y 1 does not Granger-cause y 2 , then y 2t can be treated as strictly exogenous with respect to y 1t ; so that correlations between the two can be interpreted as re ‡ecting the causal e¤ect of y 2 on y 1 : The problem here is to determine the relation between Granger-causation and causation as de…ned in this paper.
Analysts recognized immediately that Granger-causation is not the same as causation as that term is used in ordinary discussion. For example, Granger pointed out that under the de…nition just stated cattle stamping their hooves before an earthquake implies that the cattle Granger-cause the earthquake. Granger termed such cases "spurious causation", implying that the question of how to de…ne non-spurious causation remained open.
We need to understand the relation between Granger causation and causation as modeled here. We formulate a two-variable vector autoregression generating the values of the money stock m = fm t g and gross domestic product y = fy t g (note that in this section we are using y to denote GDP, not as representing a general internal variable):
Here the external variables x 1t and x 2t are independent, and are independent over time. The reduced form corresponding to this system is
GDP fails to Granger-cause the money stock if
The money stock is strictly exogenous with respect to GDP if a my = b my = 0: Strict exogeneity implies that GDP shocks do not feed back into the equation determining money, either currently or with a lag. Granger non-causation is a necessary condition for strict exogeneity, but not a su¢ cient condition. We are interested in determining what parameter restrictions are necessary for m t ! y t under the de…nition of causation proposed here. To do so we …rst write the solution form of the model under the assumption that m t is strictly exogenous:
(32) y t = a ym x 1t + (a ym b mm + b ym )x 1;t 1 + x 2t + b yy x 2;t 1 + :::
Implementation-neutral causation requires that the ratio of the coe¢ cients of x 1t in determining m t and y t equal the corresponding ratio for x 1;t 1 :
Here the reasoning is exactly the same as in Subsection 1.1. This equality is satis…ed if and only if b ym = 0:
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Thus even strict exogeneity of m is not a su¢ cient condition for interpreting the coe¢ cient of m t in equation (28) for y t as the causal coe¢ cient associated with m t ! y t . This is so because if b ym 6 = 0 the lagged values of x 1 -the external variables that determine y t through their e¤ect on m t -also a¤ect y t via m t 1 : Thus we have a failure of implementation neutrality: if b ym 6 = 0 characterizing an intervention as a hypothesized change in m t does not give enough information about the intervention to determine the resulting change in y t . Avoiding this outcome requires imposing the implementationneutrality condition b ym = 0 in addition to the strict exogeneity of m, so as to shut down m t 1 as a determinant of y t :
We see that to make the transition from Granger-noncausation to causation in the sense of this paper, one has to make two further restrictions on the model (27)-(28), beyond c my = 0. The …rst is that c my = 0 must be strengthened to a my = b my = 0: Analysts aware of the distinction between strict exogeneity and Granger non-causality frequently state that c my = 0 is consistent with a my = b my = 0; but then incorrectly go on to treat "is consistent with" as having the same meaning as "implies". Second, as we have just seen implementation neutrality requires that one rule out m t 1 as an argument in the equation for y t .
The conclusion is that Granger causation is a specialized-and, to be sure, a very useful-form of forecastability, but it cannot be directly interpreted as having anything to do with implementation-neutral causation without strong restrictions on model coe¢ cients.
It may be that we are being too narrow in trying to relate Grangercausation to causation between current values of m and y as de…ned here. The de…nition of causation here relates a single cause variable and a single e¤ect variable at the same date, whereas Granger causation involves the stochastic processes m and y: The suggestion is that a more general notion of causation is required. If so, the task at hand for proponents of Granger causation would seem to be to propose a more general characterization of (true) causation and then relate Granger causation to that.
Conclusion
In this paper we propose a speci…c meaning for causation: one variable causes another if the e¤ect of all interventions that produce a given alteration on the cause variable induce the same alteration on the e¤ect variable (of course, the alterations in the cause variable and the e¤ect variable are generally unequal). If this condition is satis…ed the answer to the question "What is the e¤ect of a change in y 1 on y 2 ? 00 does not depend on what caused the assumed change in y 1 : This, it seems to us, captures what scientists want to know when they investigate questions dealing with causation. If the condition is not satis…ed the e¤ect of y 1 on y 2 is unde…ned, implying that one can only discuss the e¤ects of the determinants of y 1 on y 2 :
Philosophers sometimes reject limiting use of the term 'causation' to settings in which interventions are implementation-neutral. For example, Cartwright [1] states that "[w]e must be careful ... not to be misled by [LeRoy's] own use of the language of 'causal order' to suppose it tells us whether and how much one quantity causally contributes to another" (p. 246). Why are we misled by this supposition? How much one quantity causally contributes to another is exactly what causation as de…ned here tells us, and is exactly what we want to know. And what meaning can we attach to a purported measure of the e¤ects of an intervention on an internal variable if the model is such that the intervention is not implementationneutral? In that case there is no alternative to redirecting the analysis to implementation-speci…c interventions on the external variables.
We saw that the algorithm proposed in this paper can be implemented to produce a directed acyclic diagram in any equation system. Under the construction here, systems with large simultaneous-equations blocks will have few or no causal arrows, re ‡ecting the fact that in such systems interventions usually cannot be adequately characterized by their e¤ects on any one internal variable. The fact that causal orderings in completely simultaneous models are completely empty is not a ‡aw of the conception of causation developed here, as one is led to conclude by some discussions. Rather, an empty causal ordering is a simple acknowledgement of the fact-familiar to economists from elementary analysis of supply-demand systems-that in simultaneous systems internal variable cannot intelligibly be interpreted as causing each other. 12 However, we noted in several places above that causal diagrams can sometimes be used in the same way under our de…nition of causation as under other de…nitions. It would be of some interest to conduct a systematic comparison of inference from causal diagrams in the two cases, although there would remain the question of how to attach meaning to causation when implementation neutrality fails.
The question of how to implement the de…nition of causation proposed here is a di¢ cult one. At a minimum, the analysis here can play the role of raising questions about discussions of causation when there is no attempt to justify the implicit assumption of intervention neutrality. The idea is to encourage clear communication about what exactly is involved in causal assertions.
